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Executive Summary 
 In mid-1995, Britain provided over 10,000 United Nations (UN) peacekeepers, more than any 
other country in the world. By 1996 this number had plummeted to a few hundred and has been 
consistently below 400 since 2005. In September 2015 Prime Minister David Cameron 
announced that the UK would deploy up to 370 British troops to UN-mandated peace operations 
in Somalia and South Sudan, more than doubling the UK’s personnel commitment to UN-
mandated operations. Combined with the withdrawal of UK forces from Afghanistan, the release 
of the 2015 Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR), and the UK’s hosting of the next 
Leaders’ Summit on Peacekeeping in September 2016, this decision has intensified debates 
about whether and how the UK should increase its participation in UN peace operations. This 
report reflects on how UN peace operations could be integrated into UK foreign policy and makes 
a case for why Britain should enhance its participation in UN peace operations. 
 
 Currently, the UK contributes to UN peace operations in four main ways:  
 
 It influences the strategic direction of operations through its permanent 
membership of the UN Security Council; 
 It is one of the largest financial contributors to the UN peacekeeping budget; 
 It helps build the capacity of other troop- and police-contributing countries; and 
 It deploys a small number of its own uniformed personnel to UN missions. 
 
The UK could also provide more peacekeepers and thereby help to fill some key capability gaps 
facing UN missions, perhaps most notably in the areas of rapid deployment, mission start-up, 
and specialist capabilities such as engineering and medical units. 
 
 By helping to fill these gaps and increase the UN’s capacity to keep the peace and protect lives, 
the UK itself could also derive, political, security, and institutional benefits: 
 
 Politically, greater participation in UN missions could bolster important bilateral relations, 
enhance UK leadership in the UN Security Council, and promote a fairer international 
division of labour for peace operations, thereby strengthening this important mechanism 
of international conflict management. 
 In turn, this would help implement the 2015 SDSR vision of a ‘secure and prosperous 
United Kingdom, with global reach and influence’. There is also a distinct possibility that 
a new generation of UN operations will deploy in and around Europe and the 
Mediterranean, potentially increasing Britain’s direct security interests in such operations.  
 Institutionally, participating in UN peace operations that involve ‘stabilisation’ tasks will 
provide new operational experiences for the British military in diverse, civilian-led 
missions designed to deliver political effects.  
 
 Enhanced UK participation in UN missions could, in part, be determined by the structure and 
niche capabilities of existing forces, and would have important implications for their training 
and doctrine. The British Armed Forces have the potential to deploy larger high-readiness 
capacities in early-entry or stabilisation roles as well as specialist capabilities, such as aviation 
assets, military intelligence/surveillance, engineering, logistics support, and medical units. 
However, enhanced engagement is likely to require reforms to the government’s institutional 
structures for decision-making, mission support, and oversight. Deployments into peace 
operations will also require UK personnel to undergo requisite training and acquire relevant 
capabilities and a sophisticated understanding of contemporary peace operations. 
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 At a strategic level, the UK Government should seek to develop greater expertise in peace 
operations and develop more effective institutional mechanisms for participating in UN 
operations. Specifically, it should: 
 
 build on the commitments given in the 2015 SDSR, by outlining a coherent strategic UK 
government approach to UN peace operations over the next parliament. 
 regularly conduct assessments of where and when it might deploy uniformed personnel 
in UN peace operations. 
 ensure that funding mechanisms for practical contributions to UN peace operations have 
the necessary flexibility and sustainability to facilitate greater UK participation. 
 facilitate greater participation of British personnel in UN operations by establishing 
frameworks to ensure UN service is a desirable career-enhancing activity. 
 
At an operational level, the Ministry of Defence (MOD) and Foreign and Commonwealth Office 
(FCO) in particular should develop coherent departmental strategies to normalise and 
encourage greater participation in UN peace operations. Specifically, these departments should: 
 
 assess the feasibility of deploying specialist military capabilities to ongoing UN missions 
and of the UK becoming a ‘Technology-Contributing Country’ (TechCC) in the 
peacekeeping field. 
 evaluate models of co-deployment and/or operational partnerships with European 
partners for deploying into UN peace operations. 
 reward military and diplomatic personnel who serve in the UN peace operations system 
and encourage greater institutional knowledge of UN peace operations among 
government and military officials. 
 undertake regular, comprehensive lessons learned studies of the new UK deployments in 
Somalia and South Sudan. 
 
 At the oversight level, Parliament should play a more active role in scrutinising UK commitments 
to UN peace operations, especially through the work of the Commons Defence and Foreign 
Affairs select committees and the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy. These 
committees should: 
 
 investigate the roles that UN peace operations can play in achieving the UK’s wider 
defence and foreign policy objectives. Inquiries should outline current departmental 
approaches to the UN, how the UK parliament oversees military commitments to UN 
operations, and the sustainability of UK military contributions to the UN. 
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1. Introduction  
The United Kingdom (UK) makes significant political and financial contributions to United Nations 
(UN) peace operations but it has not deployed many of its own uniformed personnel as peacekeepers 
since the mid-1990s. This report presents a case for why it would be in the UK’s interests to 
reconsider this policy and enhance its participation in UN peace operations, particularly in light of 
the November 2015 Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR). It argues that there are 
reasonable grounds to conclude that such enhanced participation would bring political, security, and 
institutional benefits, not least by strengthening the UN system, itself an important stated objective 
of UK foreign policy. For the British military, greater participation in peace operations would boost 
skills retention, facilitate relevant retraining, and further refine specialist capabilities developed in 
Iraq and Afghanistan. 
Historically, UK-UN relations with regard to peace operations have gone through various, sometimes 
turbulent, phases. From rocky beginnings, when Britain’s invasion of the Suez precipitated the first 
armed UN peacekeeping force (UNEF 1) in 1957, by 1995 Britain briefly became the UN’s top troop-
contributing country (TCC) through its deployments in Bosnia. Britain’s most enduring contribution 
of UN peacekeepers has been its post-colonial deployment with the UN Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP). 
Today, Cyprus is the only mission with British ‘blue helmet’ contingents deployed but the UK also 
maintains a small number of staff officers and military experts scattered across a few other UN 
missions, mainly in Africa.1 
Recently, however, there have been signs that UN peace operations might play a more significant 
part in British foreign policy. In September 2014, for instance, UK Permanent Representative to the 
UN Sir Mark Lyall Grant stated that as UK forces ‘draw down in Afghanistan, we are looking actively 
at how we can increase our existing contribution, particularly in … niche-enabling areas’.2 Four 
months later, General Sir Nicholas Houghton, Chief of the Defence Staff, concluded that the UK must 
‘be far more pro-active in our investment in UN Operations’ because ‘such operations come pre-
funded and with the benefit of an extant legal mandate which confer legitimacy’.3 Then, at the 
September 2015 Peacekeeping Leaders’ Summit, Prime Minister David Cameron pledged to deploy 
up to 70 personnel to the UN Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS) and 250-300 personnel to the UN 
Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS).4 In November, the SDSR formalised this pledge, 
stating that the UK would ‘double the number of military personnel’ that it contributes to UN 
missions, as well as committing to establish a cross-Whitehall joint UN Peacekeeping Policy Unit.5 
In September 2016, the UK will host the follow-up to the Leaders’ Summit on Peacekeeping.6 
It is, of course, difficult to know whether such sentiments and pledges to UN peace operations reflect 
a short-term, pragmatic response to domestic and international trends, or part of a more 
fundamental rethinking of how Britain pursues its foreign and security policies. In part, this is 
                                                          
1 For overviews see Paul D. Williams, ‘United Kingdom’ in Alex J. Bellamy and Paul D. Williams (eds.), Providing 
Peacekeepers (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013); David Curran and Paul D. Williams, ‘Contributor Profile: 
United Kingdom’ (International Peace Institute, hereafter IPI, Providing for Peacekeeping, 23 October 2014), 
https://s3.amazonaws.com/ipi-pdf-document-store/ppp-profiles/europe/ipi-pub-ppp-United-Kingdom.pdf; and 
Adrian Johnson, ‘Back in Blue?’, RUSI Journal, 160:1, 2015, pp.14-24. 
2 Statement by UK Permanent Representative Sir Mark Lyall Grant on Strengthening United Nations Peace 
Operations (New York, 26 September 2014). 
3 Lecture by General Sir Nicholas Houghton GCB CBE ADC Gen, Chief of the Defence Staff, UK Ministry of Defence, 
https://www.rusi.org/events/past/ref:E5284A3D06EFFD, accessed 10 June 2015. 
4 See UK Government press release, 28 September 2015, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/pm-pledges-uk-
troops-to-support-stability-in-somalia-and-south-sudan  
5 HM Government, A Secure and Prosperous United Kingdom: National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and 
Security Review 2015 (London, The Stationery Office, 2015), p.60. 
6 The 2016 Summit is to be at the level of Defence Ministers. 
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because historically, and regardless of which political party is in power, Britain has always taken a 
pragmatic approach to engaging in crisis management through the UN. 
This report supports an enhanced role for Britain in UN peace operations and sets out a case for 
greater engagement in four main sections. First, we briefly summarise current UK policy towards UN 
peace operations. Second, we examine the potential political, security, and institutional benefits that 
might flow from greater UK participation. Economic issues are also analysed, although providing 
more UN peacekeepers would require the UK to invest more financial resources. Third, we examine 
the extent to which increasing UK contributions to UN peace operations would strengthen the UN 
system and Britain’s position within it, an important dimension of contemporary UK foreign policy. 
Finally, we discuss three prudential questions that should influence consideration of potential UK 
peacekeeping deployments: what might the UK contribute; is Britain prepared to deploy 
peacekeepers into violent contexts; and is the UK military prepared for such deployments? 
2. UK Policy on UN Peace Operations 
Until late 2015, it was difficult to find a single clear statement on the role(s) UN peace operations 
might play to support British interests abroad. In part, this is because the government faced little 
pressure to make such a statement. Peacekeeping is rarely debated in the House of Commons or 
House of Lords and when relevant debates occur they are usually country-specific rather than 
addressing general peacekeeping issues. Despite a relatively favourable opinion of the UN amongst 
the British public, the armed forces have rarely been called on to deploy more frequently in UN peace 
operations.7 
Official statements have therefore usually been vague commitments to strengthen the UN via a wide 
range of initiatives.8 For instance, the UK’s 2011 Building Stability Overseas Strategy (BSOS) argued 
that because ‘our prosperity is intertwined with peaceful development and security across the globe’, 
the UK must engage with ‘fragile and conflict affected states’. One way to do this was apparently to 
strengthen international organisations, with the UK ideally playing a leading role to improve the 
‘efficiency and effectiveness’ of peace operations, to ensure such operations support peace 
processes, and that they ‘stay no longer than necessary’.9 
The UK’s 2013 International Defence Engagement Strategy was similarly vague, emphasizing the 
need to improve ‘peacekeeping operations’ but not elaborating how this should be done or the UK’s 
role in it.10 Cryptically, it also stated that the Ministry of Defence (MOD) would ‘take advantage of the 
opportunity afforded by the end of UK combat operations in Afghanistan to seek to commit greater 
effort to upstream prevention activity’.11 
                                                          
7 For instance, a 2013 Pew poll found that 6 in 10 saw the UN in a ‘favourable light’, while a 2015 
YouGov/Chatham House survey found 68% of respondents agreed that the UK has a ‘responsibility to maintain 
international security’, and 58% that the UK should provide more troops for international peacekeeping missions. 
Pew Global, Survey report: UN Retains Strong Global Image (Washington, Pew Global, 2013), 
http://www.pewglobal.org/2013/09/17/united-nations-retains-strong-global-image/, accessed 10 June 2013, and 
Thomas Raines, Internationalism or Isolationism? The Chatham House–YouGov Survey: British Attitudes Towards 
the UK’s International Priorities (London, Chatham House, 2015), p. 7. 
8 HM Government, Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and Security Review (London, 
The Stationery Office, 2010), pp. 61-2. 
9 HM Government, Building Stability Overseas Strategy (London, DFID, FCO, MOD, 2011), p. 30. 
10 HM Government, International Defence Engagement Strategy (London, MOD, 2013), pp. 2-3. 
11 Ministry of Defence, Corporate Report: The International Defence Engagement Strategy (London, MOD, 2013), p. 
4. 
OxfordResearchGroup | The UK and UN Peace Operations: A Case for Greater Engagement                     May 2016 
 
 
 
6 
In 2015, things became a little clearer. In July, the former UK Ambassador to the UN, Sir Mark Lyall 
Grant, became the Prime Minister’s National Security Advisor.12 In November, the new SDSR 
reiterated Britain’s commitment to strengthen ‘the rules-based international order and its 
institutions,’ including the UN, and built on the UK’s 2015 Aid Strategy, which committed Britain to 
‘work to build stability and tackle the root causes of conflict – both to improve the lives of millions 
around the world and to make UK citizens safer’.13 But the 2015 SDSR also made some more 
practical commitments. First, the British military would prepare to ‘conduct operations to restore 
peace and stability’.14 Second, in relation to UN peace operations, the UK would double the number 
of its military personnel deployed in UN operations, increase the numbers of its law enforcement and 
civilian experts in these missions, and continue training peacekeepers.15 Third, it also called for a 
‘cross-Whitehall joint UN Peacekeeping Policy Unit to maximise our military and civilian impact’ and 
‘formulate UK policy on peacekeeping missions’.16 
At present, UK contributions to UN peace operations can be divided into four broad categories. First, 
as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, Britain wields political influence over the 
creation, design and renewal of peace operations, including the ability to veto any operation it does 
not approve of. Along with France, Britain has been one of the most active P5 members at proposing 
Security Council resolutions, including those related to peace operations.17 The UK is the designated 
‘pen holder’ – the member of the Security Council which takes the lead in drafting resolutions – on 
several relevant issues, including Cyprus, Libya, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Darfur, and Yemen, as well 
as the thematic areas of ‘peacekeeping operations’,18 protection of civilians in armed conflict, and 
Security Council Resolution 1325 (on Women, Peace and Security). Britain’s status as penholder and 
chair of the Protection of Civilians Informal Working Group has also provided a ‘useful forum to 
discuss protection language’ in the process of mandate formulation in arguably the most important 
area in contemporary UN peacekeeping.19 The UK mission in New York has also used its seat on the 
Council to support the report of the UN High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations and 
recently reiterated three priority areas of reform: ‘better protection of civilians; better planning of 
missions and more targeted and focused mandating; and a more strategic approach to force 
generation’.20 
Second, the UK makes a major financial contribution to UN peace operations. Until 2016, the UK 
was the fifth highest provider of assessed contributions to UN peacekeeping (behind the USA, Japan, 
Germany, and France), providing 6.68% of the UN’s annual peacekeeping bill (currently estimated at 
                                                          
12 Prime Minister’s Office, Press Release, 7 July 2015, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/national-security-
adviser-appointment-sir-mark-lyall-grant, accessed 27 November 2015. 
13 HM Government, A Secure and Prosperous United Kingdom, p. 29 and HM Government, UK Aid: Tackling global 
challenges in the national interest (London, The Stationery Office, 2015), p.13. This also included a commitment to 
increase funds for the cross-government Conflict, Stability and Security Fund (discussed below). 
14 HM Government, A Secure and Prosperous United Kingdom, p. 29. 
15 Ibid. p. 60. 
16 Ibid. pp. 60, 84. 
17 See Thierry Tardy and Dominik Zaum, ‘France and the United Kingdom at the UN Security Council’ in D. Malone, 
S. Einsiedel and B.S. Ugarte (eds.), The UN Security Council (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2015), pp. 121-38. 
18 In this capacity, Britain works with the chair of the Peacekeeping Operations Working Group (in 2014/15 this 
was Rwanda) in drafting resolutions on this topic. It has been observed that the penholders ‘trump’ the chairs of 
the working groups. See, for instance, Security Council Report, February 2013 Monthly Forecast (Security Council 
Report, 2013), p. 20. 
19 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, UK National Strategy on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, 
(London, FCO, 2012), p. 2; Security Council Report, Cross-Cutting Report: Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict 
(Security Council Report, 2015), p. 2. 
20 Statement by UK Ambassador Matthew Rycroft to the UN at the General Assembly Debate on the High-Level 
Independent Panel on Peace Operations, 15 October 2015, https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/together-
we-can-and-must-make-un-peace-operations-the-best-that-they-can-be, accessed 27 November 2015. 
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$8.5 billion).21 In 2016, the UK assessed rate dropped to 5.8%, placing it sixth, behind the US, China, 
Japan, Germany and France.22 These expenses are accounted as part of defence spending in the UK 
budget. Britain also makes a notable contribution to the UN’s regular budget, which funds the UN’s 
special political missions. It is the fifth highest contributor, providing 5.179% of the annual total, 
which in 2014-15 was approximately $5.5bn. The UK thus currently provides around $850 million 
(about £590 million) in assessed contributions to UN peace operations annually and has also made 
additional voluntary contributions (either in cash or in kind) to support UN peacekeeping, and is the 
leading donor to the UN’s Peacebuilding Fund.23 
A third form of UK contributions is assistance and capacity-building initiatives used to support other 
troop- and police-contributing countries (T/PCCs). These include the deployment of specialists as 
part of various regional and bilateral capacity-building programmes, including in Kenya (British 
Peace Support Team East Africa, and British Army Training Unit Kenya), South Africa (British Peace 
Support Team South Africa), Sierra Leone, and the Czech Republic (both latter countries house an 
International Military Advisory and Training Team).24 They provide training, advice and assistance 
packages to T/PCCs engaged in UN and non-UN peace operations.25 At times, Britain has also 
provided strategic airlift for UN missions in Mali and South Sudan, supported several EU training 
missions, including in Somalia and Mali, which have supported UN operations in these theatres, and 
provided short-term engineering assistance to the non-UN Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) 
in the Sinai.26 
Fourth, Britain deploys some uniformed personnel to UN missions, although this has significantly 
reduced since the major commitment of UN peacekeepers in the Balkans during the 1990s (see 
figure 1). As of 31 April 2016, Britain deployed 302 uniformed personnel in five peacekeeping 
missions and the UN’s political mission in Somalia, UNSOM. 275 of these peacekeepers are in 
Cyprus. Britain’s contribution thus accounts for only 0.29% of total UN uniformed peacekeepers (see 
table 1). While committing only small numbers of military peacekeepers, since the late 2000s, the 
UK has contributed senior mission personnel, including Deputy Special Representatives of the UN 
Secretary-General in UNMISS (South Sudan) and MINUSCA (Central African Republic). The 
preparation for senior mission leadership has been institutionalised through the UK Stabilisation 
Unit, which provides training and support for civilian experts to deploy on international missions. 
With Prime Minister Cameron’s pledge at the Peacekeeping Leaders’ Summit in September 2015, 
the UK should more than double its military contribution to UN operations, with ‘up to 70’ personnel 
heading to UNSOS in Somalia and between 250-300 heading to UNMISS in South Sudan.27 As of 
May 2016, ten UK troops have deployed to Somalia and zero to South Sudan.28 
                                                          
21 UN, Implementation of General Assembly resolutions 55/235 and 55/236: Report of the Secretary-General 
(A/67/224/Add.1), 27 December 2012 (New York, UN, 2012); UN, Approved resources for peacekeeping operations 
for the period from 1 July 2014 to 30 June 2015: Note by the Secretary-General (A/C.5/69/17), 14 January 2015 
(New York, UN, 2015). 
22 UN doc. A/70/331, 19 August 2015, Annex III. 
23 UN Multi-Partner Trust Fund Office, The Peacebuilding Fund, http://mptf.undp.org/factsheet/fund/PB000, 
accessed 10 June 2015. 
24 UK Army, The British Army in Africa, http://www.army.mod.uk/operations-deployments/22724.aspx, accessed 
10 June 2015; MOD, British Military Advisory Training Team (Czech Republic), https://www.gov.uk/british-military-
advisory-training-team-in-the-czech-republic, accessed 10 June 2015. 
25 HM Government, A Secure and Prosperous United Kingdom, pp. 57. 
26 HM Government, Defence Secretary announces UK support to peacekeeping mission, 25 February 2016, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/defence-secretary-announces-uk-support-to-peacekeeping-mission, 
accessed 26 February 2016. 
27 UK Government press release, 28 September 2015. 
28 The UK will begin to deploy in South Sudan during summer 2016 but it is expected that deployment will be 
staggered to take account of the wet season. 
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Figure 1 - UK Uniformed Personnel in UN Peacekeeping Operations, 1990-2016 
 
 
Table 1 - UK Armed Forces and Current Contributions to Peace Operations 
Active Armed 
Forces29 
Defense Budget 
(US$) 
 
Uniformed UN 
Peacekeepers 
 
UN Contribution 
Breakdown 
Other Significant 
Deployments 
154,700 
World Ranking 
(size): 32 
 
Army: 88,300 (inc. 
2,700 Gurkhas) 
Navy: 32,500 (inc. 
7,050 Royal 
Marines) 
Air Force: 33,900 
 
Reservists: 84,000 
2015: $56.2bn 
(2.05% of GDP) 
 
2014: $61.5bn 
(2.22% of GDP) 
 
2013: $58bn 
(2.25% of GDP) 
 
2012: $61.3bn 
(2.51% of GDP) 
302 
(24 female) 
(31 April 2016) 
 
Ranking: 53rd 
 
(7th largest 
contributor from EU 
states, 5th from 
NATO) 
MINUSMA 2 troops 
 
MINUSTAH 1 police 
 
MONUSCO 5 
troops 
 
UNMISS 6 (3 
troops, 3 police) 
 
UNFICYP 275 
troops 
 
UNMIL 2 police 
 
UNSOM 12 experts 
 
Afghanistan 450 
(NATO) 
Iraq 275 (Op. 
Shader) 
Sierra Leone 27  
(Op. Gritrock) 
Serbia/Kosovo: 14  
(1 NATO, 13 OSCE) 
Bosnia: 32  
(31 EU Op. Althea, 
1 OSCE) 
Ukraine 29 (OSCE) 
EUTM Mali: 26 
EUTM Somalia: 5 
 
                                                          
29 Data is drawn from IISS, The Military Balance 2016 (London: IISS/Routledge, 2016) and UN Department of 
Peacekeeping Operations. 
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3. A Case for Greater UK Participation 
UN peace operations continue to struggle. At the strategic level, too many UN deployments are not 
tied to an effective strategy for conflict resolution, which leaves them, at best, instruments of 
damage limitation in ongoing war zones.30 At the operational level, two particular shortfalls are 
frequently identified. First, the UN remains unable to rapidly deploy most of its missions in the field. 
In his address to the 2015 UN Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (the C34), Hervé 
Ladsous stated that the UN’s six-month force generation process needs to be shortened dramatically, 
with ‘specialized capabilities that are critical in the start-up phase of an operation, including enabling 
capacities like engineering, air transportation and medical support, as well as better ways to 
establish camps and deploy units across a country’ being prioritized.31 Within this, Ladsous also 
highlighted the need to investigate standing peacekeeping capacities.32 
Second, there remain considerable gaps in specialist capabilities. This includes ‘enabling elements’ 
such as helicopters, as well as a list of other identified ‘priority areas’, outlined by Ladsous as being 
‘rapid deployment, standing capabilities; increased mobility of all units in-theatre including aviation 
support; enhanced medical support; IED survivability measures; improved information and analysis; 
expertise to address transnational threats such as organized crime, and last but not least planning 
and implementation’.33 More broadly, Ladsous identified the need for ‘consistency in capacity, 
equipment and training,’ as well as the development of new approaches to ‘training, planning, 
information gathering, analysis and intelligence’ to cope with asymmetric threats to operations.34 
The UK could help overcome these operational shortfalls in rapid deployment and specialist 
capabilities by utilizing more of its own personnel in UN peace operations. By doing so, the UK 
government could derive, political, security, and institutional benefits. Economically, such a course 
of action would require additional funds. 
Political benefits 
Providing more British UN peacekeepers could bolster important bilateral relations, enhance UK 
leadership in the UN Security Council, and promote a fairer international division of labour for peace 
operations. 
First, deploying more British peacekeepers could strengthen important UK bilateral relationships. 
Within Europe, several states have recently indicated they will make greater contributions to UN 
peace operations. Britain could improve its political relationships with these countries by joining that 
endeavor. In 2014, for example, the German and Italian governments launched an initiative entitled 
‘EU-UN Cooperation in Crisis Management and Peace Operations’, which aimed to ‘facilitate an 
exchange of lessons learned and best practices’ in the relationship. Germany will now deploy 650 
troops to the UN mission in Mali (MINUSMA).35 This followed the UN’s attempt to align European 
                                                          
30 See the report of the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (UN doc. A/70/95-S/2015/446, 17 June 
2015). 
31 Statement of Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Hervé Ladsous, Debate of the Fourth 
Committee on Peacekeeping, 28 October 2014. 
32 It is worth noting that UNISFA was able to deploy within one month (in 2011); ONUC was able to deploy in 14 
days (in 1960); and UNIFIL was able to deploy in 8 days (in 1978). 
33 Statement of Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Hervé Ladsous, Debate of the Fourth 
Committee on Peacekeeping, 28 October 2014. 
34 Statement by Under-Secretary-General Herve ́Ladsous to the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, 20 
February 2015. 
35 ‘Germany to send 650 troops to Mali’, BBC News, 25 November 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-
34924231  
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Union policies on peacekeeping with its own and the specific operations in Mali and Central African 
Republic (CAR), where both UN and EU forces deployed and therefore had to integrate policy.36  
French deployments in Mali and CAR – both preceding or in tandem with a UN peacekeeping 
operation – brought renewed attention and assessments of the impact such operations have 
sometimes had on French military activity.37 Additionally, the Netherlands and Sweden have 
deployed hundreds of troops, aircraft and intelligence capabilities to MINUSMA- many as part of the 
innovative All Sources Information Fusion Unit. The Dutch government sought to link this deployment 
with wider diplomatic initiatives aimed at increasing European contributions, including a high-level 
conference in Amsterdam, with participants from the UN and over 40 member states. 
These developments also have important implications for the UK’s relationship with the United 
States.38 The Obama administration has made a concerted effort to increase European contributions 
to UN peace operations, including through two US-led peacekeeping summits on the sidelines of the 
UN General Assembly meetings in 2014 and 2015.39 In September 2015, President Obama released 
a new policy on US support for UN peacekeeping operations, the first in over twenty years.40 Although 
the UK answered Washington’s call, its relatively small pledges led some observers to note that 
London is at ‘the bottom of the pack,’41 compared to some European states. For instance, French-
led deployments in Mali and CAR prompted some analysts to suggest that ‘if the UK wants to keep 
a special relationship with the United States, it should become more like France.’42 Perhaps in an 
effort to reverse such perceptions, the UK has agreed to host a follow-up Leaders’ Summit on 
Peacekeeping in London in September 2016. 
Greater engagement in UN peace operations could also strengthen bilateral ties with non-NATO 
states including in the G743 and the ‘BRICS’- Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa.44 This is 
particularly true with China and Brazil. First, China has reiterated its official commitment to 
supporting peacekeeping operations and is the only P5 member to have significantly increased its 
deployment of UN peacekeepers since 2004.45 Beijing sees this as one way of demonstrating it is a 
‘responsible’ power.46 Working directly with Chinese troops on this issue has been cited by the SDSR 
as a way to build a deeper relationship with China.47 It could provide a concrete example of former 
                                                          
36 Thierry Tardy and Richard Gowan, Building EU-UN Coherence in Mission Planning & Mandate Design (Berlin, ZIF, 
2014); ZIF, EU-UN Peacekeeping Partnerships Initiative, http://www.euun2014.eu, accessed 10 June 2015. 
37 Thierry Tardy, ‘The Reluctant Peacekeeper: France and the Use of Force in Peace Operations,’ Journal of 
Strategic Studies, 37:5 (2014), p. 771. 
38 Patrick Porter, ‘Last charge of the knights? Iraq, Afghanistan and the special relationship’, International Affairs 
86:2 (2010), pp. 355–75, Steven Erlanger, ‘Britain’s Drift From the Global Stage Becomes an Election Issue’, New 
York Times, 27 April 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/28/world/europe/britains-drift-from-the-global-
stage-becomes-an-election-issue.html?_r=2, accessed 10 June 2015. 
39 See, for example, Samantha Power, Remarks on peacekeeping in Brussels, 9 March 2015, 
http://usun.state.gov/briefing/statements/238660.htm  
40 United States Support to United Nations Peace Operations (The White House, 28 September 2015), 
http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2015peaceoperations.pdf  
41 See David Curran, The UK and United Nations Peace Operations (London, UN Association UK, 2015), p. 9. 
42 Judy Dempsey, Judy Asks: Is the UK-U.S. Special Relationship Over?, Carnegie Europe, 22 April 2015, 
http://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/?fa=59867, accessed 10 June 2015. 
43 The 2015 SDSR cites UK support for increased Japanese contributions to peacekeeping as a positive example of 
defence, political and diplomatic cooperation. See HM Government, A Secure and Prosperous United Kingdom, p. 
57. 
44 Niu Habin, BRICS in Global Governance: A Progressive Force? (New York, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2012), p.2. 
45 Zhao Lei, ‘Two Pillars of China’s Global Peace Engagement Strategy: UN Peacekeeping and International 
Peacebuilding’, International Peacekeeping, 18:3 (2011), p. 346. 
46 Courtney J. Richardson, ‘A Responsible Power? China and the UN Peacekeeping Regime,’ International 
Peacekeeping, 18:3 (2011), p. 289. 
47 HM Government, A Secure and Prosperous United Kingdom, p. 58. 
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UK Foreign Secretary William Hague’s call for London and Beijing to ‘work together to address the 
global challenges of our time’.48  
Peacekeeping could also strengthen Britain’s political and security relationship with Brazil, another 
major UN contributing country.49 Particularly through its leadership of the MINUSTAH operation, UK 
policymakers concluded that Brazil was increasingly ‘ready to accept a global “leadership” role’50 
Increased cooperation in peacekeeping would support the UK/Brazil Defence Cooperation 
Agreement’s stated objectives of exchanging ‘information and experiences regarding security issues 
including those acquired in the field of operations, and in the use of foreign and national military 
equipment, as well as in connection with international peacekeeping operations’.51 
Providing more British peacekeepers could also strengthen UK leadership on related matters in a 
key multilateral forum: the UN Security Council.52 Successful peacekeeping is clearly crucial to the 
Council’s credibility and effectiveness but with so few deployed personnel the extent to which the UK 
can understand contemporary challenges in the field is open to question.53 Increasing contributions 
would not only emphasize the global, collective nature of UN peace operations, but would enhance 
UK credibility with a wider range of existing partners on the Security Council, particularly those larger 
T/PCCs and non-permanent members.  
Peace operations could form part of a broader UK effort to consolidate existing relationships and 
forge a more forward-thinking approach to being a permanent member of the Council.54 This is 
particularly important when the UK is engaged in the process of Security Council reform, including 
advocating an expansion in both permanent and non-permanent members with new permanent 
seats for Brazil, Germany, India and Japan alongside permanent African representation. Providing 
more UN peacekeepers would raise Britain’s credibility and strengthen these political bonds. 
Greater UK participation in UN missions would also help create a fairer international division of 
labour for peace operations and increase UN effectiveness, thus strengthening one important global 
collective security mechanism. The ‘ambivalent’ relationship between the great powers of the West 
and UN peace operations has led critics to argue that UN peacekeeping policies are devised 
predominantly by Western states on the UN Security Council, yet undertaken by military personnel 
                                                          
48 William Hague, UK and China: Partners for growth: address to the UK-China Leadership Forum (London, 14 
September 2011), at https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/uk-and-china-partners-for-growth, accessed 7 
August 2015. See also FCO, Press Release: UK and China talks on foreign policy and security (London, 28 February 
2014), at https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-and-china-talks-on-foreign-policy-and-security, accessed 7 
August 2015. 
49 See, for instance, William Hague, Britain and Latin America: historic friends, future partners. Canning Lecture, 9 
November 2010. In 2010 the UK and Brazil signed a Defence Cooperation Agreement. See also Kai Michael Kenkel, 
‘Contributor Profile: Brazil’ (IPI Providing for Peacekeeping Project, 6 November 2015), http://ipi-pdf-document-
store.s3-website-us-east-1.amazonaws.com/ppp-profiles/south-america/ipi-pub-ppp-Brazil.pdf  
50 House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, UK–Brazil Relations Ninth Report of Session 2010–12 (London: 
The Stationery Office, 2011), p. 25. 
51 HM Government, Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland and the Government of the Federative Republic of Brazil regarding Defence Cooperation, Rio de Janeiro, 14 
September 2010 (London, The Stationery Office, 2010), p. 3. 
52 Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCDC), Joint Doctrine Note 5/11: Peacekeeping: An Evolving Role 
for Military Forces, (Shrivenham, UK MOD, 2011), p. 1-9. 
53 The growing disjuncture between New York perspectives and field perspectives was a major theme of the High-
Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations. 
54 This would be in line with Article 24(1) of the UN Charter, which places ‘primary responsibility for the 
maintenance of international peace and security’ on Security Council members. 
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from the global South, which has left numerous missions short of the critical mission enablers noted 
above.55  
This fact has not been lost in the UN itself. Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon has argued that the 
separation of those who contribute funds and those who contribute troops complicates the UN’s 
collective approach to conflict management.56 Former Under-Secretary-General for Field Support, 
Ameera Haq noted that the top 10 UN TCCs – which provide over half the uniformed personnel to 
peacekeeping operations – fill just 17% of heads of mission and deputy heads and consequently 
have little say in the strategic direction of peacekeeping.57 Amongst member states, the disparity 
has been highlighted. Major troop contributors have argued that ‘developed countries and others 
with requisite capacities must also shoulder the responsibility’ of deploying in UN missions.58 They 
have also highlighted the negative consequences of separating ‘those who wield the pen’ in 
peacekeeping from those who ‘wield the gun’.59 Similarly, US Ambassador to the UN, Samantha 
Power, recently concluded that it is ‘unsustainable and unfair’ that developed countries fund 
peacekeeping while developing countries populate the operations. She went on to note that such a 
division will not ‘produce the peacekeeping forces that today’s conflicts and our national security 
demand’.60 
To be clear, this is not just about the UK increasing the number of its peacekeepers simply to climb 
the TCC rankings. As we discuss below, it is up for debate how Britain could best contribute to 
particular missions and whether it makes more sense to deploy larger, battalion sized contributions, 
or smaller specialist contributions which fill critical gaps in areas such as aviation, engineering, 
medical and command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and 
reconnaissance (C4ISR). 
Security Benefits 
The UK might also derive national security benefits from providing more UN peacekeepers. First, it 
would help implement the vision outlined in the 2015 SDSR of a ‘secure and prosperous United 
Kingdom, with global reach and influence’, potentially ensuring that such reach and influence is 
more benignly exercised.61 Naturally, the security incentives to deploy in a UN mission would increase 
the closer it was to areas the UK government considered strategically important or helped counter 
transnational terrorism. Hence, while UN missions in CAR or DRC might resonate only very slightly 
with security concerns in Whitehall, potential calls for peace operations in Libya, Somalia, Syria, 
Yemen, and even Ukraine might raise the stakes considerably.  
                                                          
55 See, for example, Alex J. Bellamy and Paul D. Williams, ‘The West and Contemporary Peace Operations’, Journal 
of Peace Research, 46:1 (2009) and Phillip Cunliffe, Legions of Peace: UN Peacekeepers from the Global South 
(London, Hurst, 2013). 
56 See, for example, Ban Ki-moon, speech to the UN Security Council, 26 August 2011, 
www.un.org/apps/news/infocus/sgspeeches/statments_full.asp?statID=1275, accessed 10 June 2015.  
57 Statement by Under-Secretary-General Ameerah Haq to the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, 24 
February 2014. 
58 Statement by Ambassador Masood Khan, Permanent Representative of Pakistan in the Fourth Committee 
Agenda Item 53: Comprehensive review of the whole question of peacekeeping operations in all their aspects, 29 
October 2013. See also: Alex J. Bellamy and Paul D. Williams, Broadening the Base of United Nations Troop- and 
Police- Contributing Countries (IPI Providing for Peacekeeping Study No. 1, 2012). 
59 Statement by Ambassador Asoke Kumar Mukerji, Permanent Representative, at the Opening Session of the 
Annual Debate of the United Nations Peacekeeping Committee (C- 34), 24 February 2014. 
60 Reforming peacekeeping in a time of conflict: A conversation with US Ambassador to the United Nations 
Samantha Power, 7 November 2014, http://www.aei.org/events/reforming-peacekeeping-time-conflict-
conversation-us-ambassador-united-nations-samantha-power/, accessed 10 June 2015. 
61 HM Government, A Secure and Prosperous United Kingdom, p. 9. 
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Existing models of European engagement to tackle threats at source through peace operations have 
arguably reached their limits. The level of European participation in peace operations for the past 
ten years has never provided more than 8% of the personnel of UN forces.62 This has led critics to 
bemoan the ‘outsourcing’ of conflict management on the African continent, where African personnel 
are trained and equipped to ‘bear the burden’ of complex operations.63 They argue that the 
attractiveness of this policy in financial terms is far outweighed by the ‘ugly reality’ of African Union 
(AU) and UN missions in Somalia, CAR and Mali, where interveners have struggled to restore order. 
A major consequence of this – an unprecedented movement of refugees – has seriously affected 
states in the ‘European Neighbourhood’ as well as southern Mediterranean countries.64 Although not 
all refugees are from countries with UN missions, they account for a large proportion of recent 
population movements.65 Instead of building a ‘higher wall’ around the continent, the EU (and its 
member states) should invest more in peace operations as one instrument to help manage the 
violent conflicts fuelling such forced migrations.66 
It is likely that the UN will feature prominently in future responses to security issues in the European 
Neighborhood. In Libya, the EU’s NAVFOR operation could expand and scenarios involving a future 
UN peace operation cannot be ruled out entirely. In Syria, the UN has already deployed one failed 
observation mission during 2012 (UNSMIS) and may be asked to deploy another more robust 
mission when the war eventually winds down. Other missions around the European periphery (such 
as UNDOF in the Golan Heights, and UNIFIL in Lebanon) are also being tested to their limits. One 
respected body concluded that the mix of old and potentially new operations around the European 
neighborhood leaves the UN requiring ‘some serious reinforcements’.67 Without them these missions 
‘will eventually crack under the strain—with unpredictable and potentially dangerous implications for 
Europe in particular’.68 Nor should the prospect of a UN operation in Ukraine be completely 
dismissed, especially given the Ukrainian government’s support for this option.69 
Institutional Benefits 
Providing more UN peacekeepers could also represent an opportunity for the British armed forces 
as they reflect upon their future roles after the Iraq and Afghanistan campaigns. First, it would bring 
the UK military up-to-date with contemporary challenges in non-NATO peace operations. Second, 
some UN missions are increasingly likely to provide useful operational experience to UK personnel. 
Third, investment in the capabilities required to support UN peace operations could fit with the 
current restructuring of the British armed forces. 
                                                          
62 Norrie MacQueen, Europe and Peacekeeping: Rediscovering a Role? (Edinburgh, Scottish Global Forum, 2015), p. 
3. 
63 Richard Gowan and Nick Witney, Why Europe must stop outsourcing its security (London, European Council on 
Foreign Relations, 2015), p. 3. 
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Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Moldova, Morocco, Palestine, Syria, Tunisia and Ukraine. 
65 UNHCR, Asylum trends 2014: Levels and Trends in Industrialised Countries (Geneva, UNHCR, 2015), p. 23. 
66 See Gowan and Witney, Why Europe, p. 7. 
67 Security Council Report, December 2014 Monthly Forecast: UNDOF (Golan Heights) (Security Council Report, 
2014), p. 22. 
68 Richard Gowan, UN Peacekeeping: A Focus for Japanese Cooperation with the United States and Europe? 
(Washington, German Marshall Fund, 2015), p. 4. 
69 ‘Ukraine requests UN peacekeeper deployment’, Al Jazeera America, 13 March 2015, 
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First and foremost, there is growing awareness within official circles that Britain needs to refine its 
approach to peace operations. The 2011 publication of Joint Doctrine Note 5/11, entitled 
Peacekeeping: an Evolving Role (hereafter JDN 5/11), begins by recognising that as a result of 
involvement in stabilisation operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the MOD has ‘not managed to keep 
pace’ with the peacekeeping domain.70 Moreover, when discussing how ‘peacekeeping’ is framed, 
JDN 5/11 argues that the NATO definition, which heavily influences Britain’s approach, ‘no longer 
reflects the peacekeeping environment’ and is more akin to Cold War conceptions of the activity.71 
Deployments to UN peace operations beyond Cyprus would bring the UK armed forces up-to-date 
with the contemporary peacekeeping challenges, providing an opportunity to refine policy. For 
instance, policymakers and practitioners in the Netherlands have incorporated the Dutch Army’s 
experience in UN operations in South Sudan and Mali with that of their contribution to the ISAF 
deployment to develop new approaches to civil-military cooperation and their ‘comprehensive 
approach’.72 Other European states are also learning that the transition from Afghanistan to UN 
operations is not always easy or smooth.73 
Deployment to many current UN peace operations might also provide useful operational experience 
in developing the skillsets of UK military personnel. Most entail, ‘working in difficult conditions, in 
large areas with rugged terrain and limited infrastructure, dealing with multinational coalitions and 
building working relationships with international civilian and military counterparts’.74 One analysis 
of European contributions to MINUSMA noted that deployment offered these states ‘a better 
appreciation of the rationale behind certain aspects of UN peacekeeping and the benefits of a 
diverse, civilian-led, UN mission focused on advancing a political solution.’75 UN peace operations 
would also afford British troops the opportunity to work alongside a wider range of partners beyond 
NATO and former ISAF allies, such as personnel from China, Brazil, India and Indonesia– all countries 
that the UK has identified as important bilateral relationships. 
Deploying the types of specialist units called for by Hervé Ladsous (including medical, engineering, 
logistics, ISR and explosive ordnance disposal units) would also synergise with debates over how to 
restructure Britain’s armed forces. As part of the 2015 SDSR, the Government committed to ‘Joint 
Force 2025,’ which sets the baseline number of regular British Army personnel at 82,000, and 
includes the reconfiguration of a ‘number of infantry battalions… to provide an increased contribution 
to countering terrorism and building stability overseas’.76 There is some debate as to how these 
battalions are to be used, including whether they should focus on countering Mumbai-style attacks 
on the UK homeland or counter-insurgency abroad. However, the UK military would undoubtedly 
continue its defence engagement and capacity-building, as well as the provision of training, 
assistance, advice and mentoring to UK partners.  
                                                          
70 DCDC, ‘Joint Doctrine Note 5/11’, p. 1-1. 
71 Ibid, p. 1-5. 
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Additionally, as part of the UK’s restructuring (which included the ‘Future Force 2020’ process77), in 
2014 the House of Commons Defence Committee called for more flexible deployment capabilities.78 
Examining the development of UN peace operations in theatres such as Mali, the Committee argued 
that the MOD should re-examine ‘the successes of Sierra Leone and Bosnia, and ask what 
capabilities might be required to improve the chance of success in current crisis zones such as Libya, 
Yemen, Ukraine or Iraq’.79 It is notable that the Committee linked these developments to earlier UN 
missions and conflict zones that might end up hosting a UN operation. If Britain does develop such 
flexible capacities, employing them in UN missions would be a logical way to gain operational 
experience. 
Economic Issues 
Deploying more British peacekeepers would cost money. However, two issues are worth discussing. 
First, the UN provides a favorable rate of reimbursement for deployments in comparison with other 
multilateral institutions. Second, there are some relevant financial possibilities created by the 
establishment of the UK’s new Conflict Security and Stability Fund (CSSF). 
With the drawdown of a costly Afghanistan campaign, mixed with austerity-led government policies, 
questions have been raised over the UK Treasury’s willingness to fund additional large-scale 
operations.80 For instance, in 2013 the government requested that the MOD contribute £25 million 
to the Deployed Military Activity Pool (DMAP), which funds ‘the initial and short term costs of any 
unforeseen military activities, as authorized by the National Security Council’.81 Although the DMAP 
does not replace the Special Reserve – the budget line that covers large scale UK deployments – it 
has brought concerns from parliamentarians over the willingness of the UK Treasury to fund 
operations.82 In this financial climate, deploying more units to UN operations would cost the UK 
money but the UN may offer a more financially viable model for deploying such forces than other 
options. Increasing contributions to UN peace operations has even been proposed as one of a range 
of measures to adapt the UK military to policies of austerity.83 
T/PCCs in UN operations recoup some of the costs of deployment through the UN’s reimbursement 
process. For the first time since 2002, the level of allowances for troops and formed police units has 
risen.84 In 2014, the UN General Assembly agreed a single rate of reimbursement to contingent 
personnel in UN operations to the amount of US$1,332 per person per month, from 1 July 2014. 
Over the next two years, this will increase to US$1,365 per person per month as from 1 July 2016, 
and US$1,410 per person per month as from 1 July 2017.85 In addition, US$68 per month is given 
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in ‘personal clothing, gear and equipment allowance’ and US$5 per month on ‘personal weaponry 
and training ammunition’.86 
Unlike for some poorer countries, UN reimbursements will not cover the costs of recruitment, training 
and deploying UK military personnel.87 Nevertheless, the UN model may be more beneficial than the 
financial support packages available from NATO and the EU. In NATO operations the costs lie where 
they fall. Countries that participate thus have to carry the burden almost exclusively, as opposed to 
sharing it through a joint funding mechanism.88 Some states view this system as a disincentive to 
become involved in extensive deployments.89 Some UK policymakers criticized this system when 
NATO was establishing its Reaction Force and similar concerns were raised at the 2014 summit in 
Wales.90 The EU, in contrast to NATO, has adopted the ‘Athena Mechanism’– a method of cost-
sharing whereby 27 Member States91 pool resources to help finance the common costs involved in 
EU military operations.92 The problem lies with the practical implementation of this system. As Tardy 
notes, since the Treaty of the European Union prohibits expenditure arising from operations with 
military or defence implications being covered by the EU budget, in practice a system similar to 
NATO’s ‘cost lie where they fall’ system may actually operate for EU missions.93 
In 2013, the UK established the CSSF to replace the existing Conflict Pool, which until 2014-15 had 
covered the peacekeeping budget. The Conflict Pool was a joint FCO-MOD-DFID mechanism with a 
budget of £683 million in 2014-15, of which a minimum of £374 million would be spent on the UK 
Government’s peacekeeping budget.94 However, the unpredictable volatility in peacekeeping costs 
had the potential to severely impact budgets in other areas. In 2009-10, for instance, rising 
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peacekeeping costs led to a reduction of around £80 million in other Conflict Pool activities.95 This 
created uncertainty in the wider planning for the Conflict Pool, and led to ‘disincentives’ for staff to 
engage with the Conflict Pool. The CSSF has an expanded budget of over £1 billion (to be increased 
to £1.3 billion by 2019/20).96 Instead of being managed by three departments it is run by the 
National Security Council. This new mechanism might make it easier for the government to spend 
money on a relatively small but unexpected peacekeeping deployment without causing as many 
opportunity costs as under the previous system.97 
4. A Strengthened System of UN Peace Operations 
UN peace operations have come a long way since UK engagement in Bosnia (UNPROFOR) and Sierra 
Leone (UNAMSIL)– both of which created a largely negative ‘popular mythology’ in the UK about the 
shortcomings of the UN system.98 The ‘back end’ of UN support for peacekeeping has been 
undergoing reform since the 2000 so-called Brahimi Report, which set out a significant agenda for 
restructuring and professionalizing the UN’s capacities for undertaking peace operations.99 The UK 
and France have played important roles in this process, including launching a ‘non-paper’ in 2009, 
intended to begin a process of addressing ‘priority’ challenges in three areas: effective strategic 
oversight, resource constraints, and lessons from implementation. The non-paper advocated for 
‘monitoring capabilities in New York’ to be strengthened, evaluation of missions to be improved, and 
‘coordinated action’ to implement ‘a more effective process of preparation and management’ of 
troop contributors. This push for reform resulted in three notable policy developments.100 
First, it facilitated the UN’s ‘capability-driven approach’ to peacekeeping contributions and force 
generation.101 This sought to replace a ‘numbers only’ approach to force generation with one focused 
on delivering the ‘skills, capacity and willingness of personnel, as well as materiel, to deliver required 
results’.102 This shift reflected the belief that too often ‘the imperative to deploy has taken priority 
without due regard for the equipment, self-sustainment, training, and capabilities that catalyse the 
ability of troops to function effectively – and safely’. Thus ‘boots on the ground’ are important, but 
they need to be accompanied by key ‘enablers’.103 This approach could stand or fall based on 
whether or not European states contribute specialized capabilities, especially ‘relating to heavy 
lifting, engineering, mobility, intelligence, medevac and hospital provision, and rapid reaction or high-
intensity capabilities’.104 
Second, the establishment in 2013 of the UN’s Directorate for Peacekeeping Strategic Partnership 
provides a mechanism to oversee the peace operations system. Under General Assembly Resolution 
67/297, the office’s main functions are to identify gaps that have an impact on mandate delivery, 
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make recommendations on ‘systemic issues relating to United Nations peacekeeping operations’, 
offer recommendations to ensure safety, security and welfare of peacekeeping personnel, work with 
senior mission leadership, and troop-contributing countries, and make recommendations to 
incorporate lessons learned and best practices from previous missions into future ones.105 
Third, the reforms generated the UN’s Global Field Support Strategy, which sought to improve 
financing, human resources, and supply chain management for deployed operations.106 Clearly there 
is still a long way to go amongst the organs of the UN to implementing a fail-safe approach.107 And 
despite the stalling of this agenda and multiple complaints from field personnel about inadequate 
forms of mission support, there is enough promise in the overall concept to warrant a renewed effort 
to make these reforms work effectively to deliver improved performance in the field and in UN 
headquarters. 
To date, however, UK engagement in these reforms has been confined to the policy level. As Johnson 
argued, ‘this is a contradiction, not a mitigation’.108 And as Smith and Boutellis observed, increased 
European involvement after the reduction of commitments in Afghanistan could present ‘a window 
of opportunity to consolidate the shift from numbers-driven to capability-driven peacekeeping’.109 
This has been evident in European participation in the MINUSMA operation in Mali, where European 
engineering capacities to build base camps demonstrated the potential to enable a UN mission in 
the start-up phase. European countries also provided important operational assistance and 
mentoring to other T/PCCs on how to operate in asymmetric environments and how to counter 
improvised explosive devices (IEDs). As Karlsrud and Smith suggest, the individual and collective 
experiences of European contributors to MINUSMA provide an opportunity ‘for the UN system to learn 
and adapt to the changing environment it is facing on the ground’110  
It is important to consider these developments in the institutional architecture of the UN, particularly 
as UK policymakers have for the past fifteen years preferred alternative models of deploying force 
internationally. The problematic experiences of being part of UNPROFOR in Bosnia led the UK 
policymaking establishment to see NATO as the multilateral vehicle of choice for British military 
deployments. This NATO/UK relationship has been strengthened through British participation in the 
ISAF deployment in Afghanistan. Additionally, even when Britain deployed forces to Sierra Leone in 
2000 in an operation that ultimately assisted the UNAMSIL deployment, UK forces remained outside 
the UN operation, a decision in large part down to the considerable skepticism within the MOD about 
UN competence and its command and control mechanisms.111 As a result, British troops worked in 
parallel with but not as part of UNAMSIL in Sierra Leone; their first objective being the evacuation of 
UK citizens, not supporting the floundering UN operation.112 Post-ISAF, it remains to be seen whether 
Cameron’s apparent support for UN peacekeeping initiatives represents a restoration of UK trust in 
UN-led peace operations.  
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5. Questions for Future UK Participation 
Even if it is accepted that an abstract case can be made for greater UK participation in UN peace 
operations, real policy challenges and crises revolve around decisions made about particular issues 
in particular places at particular times.113 Three prudential questions therefore need to be discussed: 
what the UK could contribute, what type of missions it would consider, and what preparations would 
need to be made? 
1) What might the UK contribute? 
It is too early to judge whether the UK’s pledges to deploy troops to UNMISS and UNSOS will represent 
a model of future British engagement with UN peace operations. Nevertheless, JDN 5/11 outlines a 
range of UK options that could be made available to UN peace operations; specifically, how to fill UN 
capability gaps concerning rapid deployment, reacting quickly to ceasefires, or ‘unexpected shocks 
in extant UN peacekeeping missions’.114 This would include using ‘the UK’s high-readiness military 
capability either in an early-entry or contingency peacekeeping role.’ An indication of this rapidly 
deployable capacity may be seen in the establishment of the Royal Navy ‘Response Force Task 
Group’– a rapid reaction force that ‘deals with unexpected world events that require military 
intervention’. Established under the 2010 SDSR, the task group concept was intended to allow a 
deployment similar to the UK’s operations in Sierra Leone in 2000, which supported an existing UN 
operation.115 
Other options referred to by JDN 5/11 involve specialist capabilities. These are listed as support 
helicopters, military intelligence/surveillance, logistic support, and field hospitals and evacuation 
capabilities, as well as some newly established mechanisms such as the Military Stabilisation 
Support Group (MSSG), the Defence Cultural Specialist Unit, Stabilisation Response Teams, and 
Female Engagement Teams.116 One option for deploying such capabilities would be in a ‘package 
contribution’ wherein a country deploys enough personnel – including special forces, ISR capabilities, 
close air support, and assets for casualty evacuation – to limit its reliance on the UN system and 
other T/PCCs within the mission. This has been adopted by other European states. In 2013, for 
example, the Dutch government made a ‘package contribution’ to MINUSMA with a deployment of 
579 peacekeepers, as well as four Apache attack helicopters.117 
Challenges have been identified in each of these options. Specialist capabilities have limitations 
when deployed in missions that encounter fundamental obstacles that are ‘too great for such a niche 
force to offset’.118 Larger contributions may mean that Britain takes on a greater burden regarding 
the success or failure of a peace operation as a whole. In the post-Afghanistan context, where the 
limitations of the UK’s military apparatus are apparent, policymakers may shy away from the risks 
associated with another sizeable deployment but it would be unwise to rule such a deployment out 
in principle. 
One pragmatic approach may lie in engaging more with like-minded European states that already 
deploy considerable contributions in UN peace operations. The model of co-deployment or 
operational partnerships wherein two or more countries combine their personnel to form a single 
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military unit is increasingly utilised across a range of UN missions.119 The UK could certainly benefit 
from the burden sharing approach, and can draw from its experience of engaging with European 
partners in a range of non-UN joint deployment initiatives (such as the UK/Netherlands Amphibious 
Force). There are indications that the UK is at least considering this line of thinking. In January 2015, 
for example, the MOD signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the Irish Department of Defence 
to enhance cooperation in supporting ‘UK Armed Forces engagement in peacekeeping operations, 
through the provision of peacekeeping training and addressing the potential of joint Ireland/UK 
contributions to UN mandated and UN led peacekeeping operations’.120 Ireland could provide a 
useful and highly experienced partner for such co-deployment. The Irish military has a long history 
of providing UN peacekeepers and is known for its willingness to ‘serve the UN in places where other 
European countries would not’.121 
Finally, there is the option of Britain aiming to become what Walter Dorn has called a ‘technology-
contributing country’ or TechCC.122 Designed to complement existing notions of troop – and police – 
contributing countries, under this new concept, the TechCC provides other contributors, field 
missions and UN headquarters with technological concepts, equipment, advice and support. While 
TechCCs can also contribute personnel they focus on providing strategic enablers through 
technology. 
2) Is the UK prepared to deploy peacekeepers into violent contexts? 
There is already an expeditionary element to the UK’s future defence plans, which would likely 
involve deployments in volatile areas.123 In 2014 the UN’s Department of Safety and Security 
assessment concluded that more than 40% of the UN’s areas of deployment were ‘substantially, 
highly, or extremely dangerous’– up from 25% in 2011.124 Additionally, more than two-thirds of all 
peacekeeping personnel are operating in ‘contexts with significant levels of on-going violence’, 
(including complex operations in Darfur, South Sudan, Mali, CAR, Somalia, and DRC).125 These 
regions often lack clear political frameworks to manage belligerents, are beset by violent armed 
actors, deliberate attacks against civilian populations, transnational criminal networks, and 
organisations that engage in terrorist acts.126 In such circumstances, force protection cannot always 
be guaranteed and yet most policymakers remain extremely sensitive to taking casualties. Both the 
Afghanistan and Iraq campaigns generated significant numbers of British casualties and concerns 
would rightly be raised were UK peacekeepers deployed into highly volatile environments. 
Casualty sensitivity often leads governments to use ‘caveats’ aimed at averting risk to their own 
personnel. While caveats are often inserted into the MOU between the TCC and the UN, the UN 
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sometimes has no knowledge of a caveat, which can lead to huge planning and operational 
difficulties for UN Force Commanders and contingents from other countries.127 Caveats highlight 
concerns that contributing countries hold about the capacities of the mission and the wider UN 
system to react if their peacekeepers are targeted. UN systems and standards may differ in key 
areas, such as casualty evacuation of wounded personnel and access to hospitals. Moreover, 
questions over command and control have often been raised in relation to how operations react to 
armed attacks on peacekeepers. This was highlighted during mid-2014, when a Philippine 
contingent in the Golan Heights ‘stood their ground’ when surrounded by Syrian rebels. The order to 
do so came not from the UNDOF Force Commander, but from the unit’s commanding officer in 
Manila. This illustrates a ‘fundamental problem’ with peacekeeping, namely that ‘when bullets fly, 
[national contingents] have no problem disobeying U.N. force commanders and taking orders from 
home’.128 
The UK would be well placed to lead by example in publicly rejecting the use of caveats as a counter-
productive policy that undermines unified command and control, and hence the effectiveness of UN 
field missions. 
3) Is the UK military prepared for deployment in UN peace operations? 
The UK’s Joint Doctrine Note 5/11 recognises that for the British military to increase its participation 
in contemporary UN peace operations it will need the ‘requisite training, capability, and 
understanding of peacekeeping operations to be effective’.129 Working on the basis that ‘a 
peacekeeper will not be able to function effectively without a credible level of understanding of the 
mission’s mandate’, JDN 5/11 advocates that UK commanders become ‘immersed’ as soon as 
possible in relative knowledge as soon as a decision is made to deploy.130 
Such immersion would help overcome the current gap between the skills required for contemporary 
peace operations, and what has been defined as the ‘warfighting ethos’ of the UK military. Again, 
this is not a new concern.131 However, it has been a topic of special reflection with regards to 
Afghanistan. King’s analysis of the UK’s Helmand Campaign in Afghanistan, for instance, examined 
the utility of the ‘Warfighting Ethos’ of UK forces, particularly its impact on wider processes of 
stabilisation in the country. Whilst King found this ethos was ‘highly effective’, he argued that at 
times a fine line could be identified ‘between a willingness to act decisively and accept the risks 
associated with that action and a positive alacrity to become engaged in combat as a professional 
good in itself’.132 This meant that tactical activity would often trump ‘careful political consideration’ 
of the situation or long term priorities, with such activity taking precedence over less spectacular but 
strategically decisive missions- such as training Afghan national security forces, or negotiating with 
local leaders in order to learn about the environment.133 Deployment in some UN peace operations 
may well require the tactical use of force but they are primarily missions designed to facilitate 
political effects and troops should be trained accordingly.134 
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Fortunately, there exists a lineage of peacekeeping training amongst UK military personnel. For 
instance, the UK’s military officer training programme, run at the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst 
(RMAS) incorporates a range of topics run by the department of ‘communication and behavioural 
sciences’, which includes training on negotiation skills and techniques for the military practitioner.135 
Officer training simulations at RMAS have also been developed to reflect deployment in civilian 
environments.136 As seen above, this is supported by research and development into doctrine 
undertaken by the Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCDC), and supported by other 
groups that have developed specialist capabilities to work with civilian organisations in stabilisation 
contexts.137 
Doctrinally, the UK military has proved adaptable to the challenges likely to arise in UN peace 
operations. The experience of UNPROFOR in the mid-1990s led to considerable debate on the future 
direction of peacekeeping, and ultimately the publication of Joint Warfare Publication 3-50: Peace 
Support Operations.138 JWP 3-50 was a significant step forward in peacekeeping doctrine, including 
on the role of consent, the need for effective civil-military cooperation, and a range of wider skills 
and techniques.139 Attempts to re-orientate some of the UK’s armed forces to the demands of peace 
operations will not be a quick-fix, particularly if resistance emerges from those who believe that 
peacekeeping is not an appropriate use of Britain’s military. This is not unusual. Other European 
countries that have pledged to increase contributions experienced a lag between political 
commitment and the deployment of forces.140 In the UK context, it remains to be seen how the 
changes brought about by ‘Joint Force 2025’ will develop a strategic acceptance that peace 
operations are part of UK military activity. 
6. Conclusions and Recommendations  
The UK’s position as a permanent member of the UN Security Council gives it a special set of 
responsibilities. One of them is to ensure that peace operations work effectively. While Britain has a 
track record of providing financial and political support to UN peace operations, as well as training 
other T/PCCs, this does not (and should not) preclude greater military contributions, including the 
deployment of sizable contingents of UK forces. 
The signals emanating from the UK government since 2015 are encouraging. But in a time of 
austerity, a clear strategic case needs to be made to justify and explain a greater focus on peace 
operations. This is possible but the 2015 SDSR remains incomplete on that score. Moreover, the 
momentum generated by the 2015 SDSR and diplomatic initiatives in New York need to be 
maintained and built upon before they dissipate. The UK’s decision to host the September 2016 
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follow-up to President Obama’s 2015 peacekeeping summit should provide the necessary political 
focus. 
Greater British participation in UN peace operations would increase their effectiveness and hence 
strengthen the overall UN system. This is not an insignificant point for a state that will increasingly 
rely on multilateral endeavours for its foreign policy impact. Britain could help fill some key capability 
gaps in existing UN operations and help deliver a more effective international division of labour for 
the peace operations system. UK leadership in this area might encourage other UN member states 
to do likewise.  
Initiatives now coming to fruition such as the Capability Driven Approach derive in part from UK and 
French efforts to improve UN operations. It would be a missed opportunity not to support these 
reforms in the field as well as in New York. As European contributions to MINUSMA are 
demonstrating, greater European engagement in UN missions can improve standards and 
modernise systems.141 But, if Britain’s political leadership chooses greater engagement in UN peace 
operations, the UK military will need time to prepare, including revising some elements of doctrine 
and conducting the resulting training and education. 
At a strategic level, the UK Government should seek to develop greater expertise in peace operations 
and develop more effective institutional mechanisms for participating with UN operations. 
Specifically, the UK Government should: 
 build on the commitments given in the 2015 SDSR by outlining a coherent strategic UK 
government approach to UN peace operations over the next parliament. This should include 
a commitment to increase contributions of British military capabilities. 
 conduct regular assessments of where and when it might usefully deploy uniformed 
personnel in UN peace operations. 
 ensure that funding mechanisms for practical contributions to UN peace operations have the 
necessary flexibility and sustainability to facilitate greater UK participation. 
 facilitate greater participation of British personnel in UN operations by establishing 
frameworks to ensure that serving in the UN is a desirable career-enhancing activity, 
cultivating greater institutional knowledge of UN peace operations, and engaging in joint 
training and planning initiatives for UN operations with European partners.  
At an operational level, the FCO and MOD in particular should develop coherent departmental 
strategies to normalise and encourage greater participation in UN peace operations. Specifically, 
these departments should: 
 assess the feasibility of deploying specialist military capabilities to ongoing UN missions, 
thereby helping to fill capability gaps outlined by the UN, and of the UK becoming a TechCC 
in the peacekeeping field. 
 evaluate models of co-deployment and/or operational partnerships with European partners 
for deploying into UN peace operations. 
 cultivate a cultural and organizational shift to appropriately reward military and diplomatic 
personnel who serve in the UN peace operations system and encourage greater institutional 
knowledge of UN peace operations among government and military officials.  
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 undertake comprehensive lessons learned studies of the new UK deployments in Somalia 
and South Sudan. 
At the oversight level, Parliament should play a more active role in scrutinising UK commitments to 
UN peace operations, especially through the work of the Commons Defence and Foreign Affairs 
select committees and the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy. These committees 
should: 
 investigate the roles that UN peace operations can play in achieving the UK’s wider defence 
and foreign policy objectives. Inquiries should outline current departmental approaches to 
the UN, how the UK parliament oversees military commitments to UN operations, and the 
sustainability of UK military contributions to the UN. 
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